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FOREWORD
A ‘Coyote Warrior’ and the ‘Great Paradoxes,’ the Scholarship of
Professor Raymond Cross
Monte Mills*∗
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1
II. PARADOX I: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS .................................. 4
III. PARADOX II: TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE FEDERAL
TRUST RESPONSIBILITY ...................................................................... 7
IV. A LEGACY FOR INDIAN LEGAL EDUCATION .................................... 12
“How these paradoxes play out in real people’s lives is not simply a story
about Indians. It is the story of America, a story about all of us. How we
resolve these great paradoxes is our own Age of Discovery, one that asks
all Americans, ‘After the storms, who are we?”
Raymond Cross 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Indian law is home to virtually innumerable paradoxes. Indeed,
the field’s foundations were laid by Chief Justice John Marshall’s struggle
to reconcile the presence of indigenous societies, which had exercised
territorial, governmental, and cultural sovereignty in the “New World”
since time immemorial, with the doctrines of European colonists who

*
Assistant Professor and Co-Director, Margery Hunter Brown Indian
Law Clinic, Alexander Blewett III School of Law, University of Montana. I am
grateful for the assistance and support of the editors and staff of the Public Land &
Resources Law Review, especially Taylor Thompson and Kathryn Sears Ore, and for
the helpful comments and advice of Professors Michelle Bryan and Maylinn Smith.
We all owe a particular debt of gratitude to Raymond Cross, who, along with Margery
Hunter Brown, forged an eternally inspiring legacy of excellence in Indian, public
lands, and natural resources law here at the University of Montana.
1.
PAUL VANDEVELDER, COYOTE WARRIOR: ONE MAN, THREE TRIBES,
& THE TRIAL THAT FORGED A NATION 8 (2004). From poets, religious scholars, and
Charles Darwin to Chief Plenty Coups, nearly every one of Raymond Cross’ scholarly
works begins with a thought-provoking quote. Thus, it is only fitting to begin this
issue with his own words.
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ascribed to an incongruent notion of superior governmental authority. 2
The subsequent centuries of federal policy, United States Supreme Court
precedent, and tribal nation building have deepened and complicated many
of these challenges. One need only look at recent headlines, 3 decisions of
the Supreme Court, 4 and the actions of tribal governments to see these
paradoxes play out in the present day. 5
Raymond Cross has long lived and worked in this world of
paradoxes. A member of the Three Affiliated Mandan, Hidatsa, and
Arikara Tribes of North Dakota (Three Affiliated Tribes or MHA Nation),
Cross was born in Elbowoods, North Dakota, 6 in the heart of the Tribes’
world. 7 Elbowoods lay in the fertile Missouri River valley near the center
of the MHA Nation’s Fort Berthold Reservation. 8 Just before his birth,
Congress authorized construction of Garrison Dam, which, following its
completion in the early 1950s, held back the mighty Missouri River,
flooding Cross’ birthplace, family home, and over 150,000 acres of the
MHA Nation’s treaty-reserved homelands. 9 Cross’ father, Martin Cross,
led the Three Affiliated Tribes’ fight against the dam as the Tribes’
Chairman, passionately demanding that Congress recognize the Tribes’
rights to the lands that would be lost.10 Thereafter, Chairman Cross took
on the federal government’s termination policy, particularly when
Congress considered the MHA Nation for termination of its tribal status. 11

2.
See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 591–92 (1823)
(recognizing that “converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest”
appears an “extravagant . . . pretension”).
3.
See, e.g., Paul VanDevelder, Reckoning at Standing Rock, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/articles/Reckoning-atStanding-Rock.
4.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. ____, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017)
(refusing to extend tribal sovereign immunity to an individual tribal employee).
5.
See, e.g., Justin Franz, Critics Emerge as BIA Reviews New
Blackfeet Constitution, FLATHEAD BEACON (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://flatheadbeacon.com/2016/09/12/critics-emerge-bia-reviews-new-blackfeetconstitution/; see also Constitution, BLACKFEET NATION,
http://blackfeetnation.com/government/constitution/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
6.
VANDEVELDER, supra note 1, at 138.
7.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. FENN, ENCOUNTERS AT THE HEART OF THE
WORLD: A HISTORY OF THE MANDAN PEOPLE (2015).
8.
VANDEVELDER, supra note 1, at 16.
9.
MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS REVISITED: THE
CONTINUING HISTORY OF THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI RIVER SIOUX 52
(2009).
10.
See, e.g., VANDEVELDER, supra note 1, at 114–38.
11.
Id. at 163–73.
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Thus, from his earliest days, Raymond Cross existed within and
was affected by federal Indian law and policy. It is no surprise that he
picked up the fight on behalf of his people as an attorney, leading an effort
to ensure that Congress recognized the Three Affiliated Tribes’ claims to
damages and promised water development projects that never materialized
following construction of Garrison Dam. 12 Those efforts ultimately
resulted in Congress providing for nearly $150 million in compensation
for the Tribes’ losses. 13 The decades-long fight to secure rightful
compensation for the flooding of the MHA Nation’s homeland is simply
one example of how Cross dedicated his career to fighting for Indian
Country—first, as an attorney working for Indian tribes and tribal people,
then, as a professor, teaching and inspiring others while researching and
writing as a scholar of Indian law. 14
This special issue of the Public Land & Resources Law Review is
dedicated to this latter phase of Raymond Cross’ career, his scholarly
work. In the pieces republished here, Cross takes on paradoxes at the core
of federal Indian law; the federal trust responsibility, 15 protecting the
connection to indigenous lands, 16 and the exercise of tribal sovereignty to
promote economic success. 17 In addressing each of these complex topics,
Cross inspires current and future leaders in the field while drawing on his
deep experience and skills as a practitioner, not just theorist, of the law.
As such, this collection is far more than simply a well-deserved tribute that
preserves two decades of insightful Indian law scholarship. Rather, this
volume serves as a gathering place for Cross’ broad-ranging wisdom and
intellect, providing readers with a contemporary context and enduring
analysis of the modern challenges posed by the ‘great paradoxes’ of Indian
law.

12.
Id. at 201–19.
13.
See Title XXXV of the Reclamations Projects Authorization and
Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4731 (Oct. 30, 1992).
14.
For a biography of Professor Cross and his family, see generally
VANDEVELDER, supra note 1.
15.
Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian SelfDetermination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369 (2003)
[hereinafter Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?].
16.
Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the
Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425
(1998) [hereinafter Sovereign Bargains]; Raymond Cross, Development’s Victim or
its Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 535 (2011) [hereinafter Victim or Beneficiary?].
17.
Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893 (2000)
[hereinafter Tribes as Rich Nations]; Victim or Beneficiary?, supra note 16.
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Most critically, readers will gain new perspective on present-day
conflicts over natural resources, which often implicate rights to land
reserved by tribes through treaties and which may threaten the connections
between tribal communities and their current or traditional land base.
Similarly, the works in this collection highlight the problems and
possibilities of tribal self-determination, including the challenges of
effectively exercising tribal sovereignty and the limitations of the federal
trust responsibility to tribes. The remainder of this introduction briefly
contextualizes each of these themes so readers can draw these and other
connections to the work republished herein.
II. PARADOX I: NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS
Conflicts over land and natural resources have helped define
federal Indian law from its very origin. 18 Land and the respective rights
of tribes and non-Indians to occupy and possess it drove the negotiation of
many treaties entered into by and between tribes and the young federal
government until the end of formal treaty-making in 1871. 19 The solemn
bargains represented in the language of each treaty not only outlined the
rights and responsibilities reserved by each party but also marked a
meeting of the minds over how two distinct worldviews might interact and
coexist. As the aboriginal inhabitants of the land, Indian tribes and their
members sought to maintain and protect their ways of life by reserving
their rights to their lands and traditional activities, such as fishing and
hunting, throughout their territory. 20 On the other hand, at least initially,
the young federal government sought certainty, protection, and largely
negotiated with tribes on the same basis as international allies. 21
Implicitly imbedded in the tribal reservation of lands and rights in
each treaty is the preservation of tribal cultural and spiritual connections
to the natural world. The creation stories of the Three Affiliated Tribes,
as an example, tell of Lone Man and First Creator selecting the lands of
18.
See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
19.
See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.03[1], at 23–
30 (Nell Jessup Newton, ed. 2012).
20.
See, e.g., Treaty between the United States and the Flathead,
Kootenay, and Upper Pen d’Oreilles Indians art. 3, July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975
(reserving to the Tribes the right of “taking fish at all usual and accustomed places”).
21.
See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551 (1832) (“When
the United States gave peace, did they not also receive it? Were not both parties
desirous of it? If we consult the history of the day, does it not inform us that the
United States were at least as anxious to obtain it as the Cherokees? We may ask,
further: did the Cherokees come to the seat of the American government to solicit
peace; or, did the American commissioners go to them to obtain it?”).
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the Fort Berthold Reservation “as the tribal people’s permanent
homelands.” 22 The Tribes reserved their rights to the area in the 1851
Treaty of Fort Laramie, which, as described by one commentator,
represented “a formal recognition of what had been an informal
arrangement since the fifteenth century . . . enclos[ing] 12 million acres
containing many of the tribe's sacred sites and traditional hunting
grounds.” 23 This land base, though reduced by subsequent agreement to
form the present day reservation of the MHA Nation, 24 is central to the
cultural and legal identity of the Tribes. Indeed, the Fort Berthold
Reservation is like all Indian lands that, “form[] the basis for social,
cultural, religious, political, and economic life for American Indian
nations.” 25
In the 20th Century, the Supreme Court explicitly opened the door
for Congress to abrogate treaty promises without regard for tribal input or
consent. 26 Concurrently, the federal government pursued a policy of
allotment and assimilation, which, from 1887 to 1934, resulted in the loss
of 90 million acres of tribal land, nearly two-thirds of tribal land base at
the time. 27 Though the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act ended allotment
and restored some unallotted and unsettled lands to tribes, 28 challenges to
tribal land ownership and threats to the tribal land base have remained.
For example, the federal government’s authorization and construction of
dams along the Missouri River resulted in the flooding and loss of
hundreds of thousands of acres of tribal land from the Sioux and Fort
Berthold reservations. 29 These threats are not just stories for history books
as the friction between the pressures of a non-Indian society and the rights
reserved by tribes in those time-honored, government-to-government
bonds persist. 30
In light of this continuing paradox, Cross’ scholarship offers fresh
and alternative visions for protecting the cultural connection between
tribal people and places, for ensuring due compensation for the taking of
22.
Victim or Beneficiary?, supra note 16, at 545.
23.
VANDEVELDER, supra note 1, at 72.
24.
Agreement with Indians at Fort Berthold Agency, Dec. 14, 1886, 26
Stat. 1032 (ratified in 1891).
25.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, § 15.01, at 994–95.
26.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
27.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 19, § 1.04, at 73.
28.
25 U.S.C. § 463 (2012).
29.
LAWSON, supra note 9, at 40–57.
30.
See, e.g., Jenny Schlecht, 1851 Treaty Resonates in DAPL
Discussion, BISMARCK TRIBUNE (November 10, 2016),
http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/treaty-resonates-in-dapldiscussion/article_e9bd6a47-e14e-507e-bb0a-8ee29eb30c9e.html.
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Indian lands, and for tribal governments wrestling with the promise of
economic benefit and the perils of natural resource destruction. For
example, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of
Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century offers a new perspective on
how tribes should be compensated by the federal government for the
taking of Indian lands, such as those flooded by federal projects along the
Missouri River. 31 Drawing upon his extensive experience representing
and advocating for the MHA Nation in the Tribes’ decades-long fight to
achieve fair compensation for that lost land, Sovereign Bargains traces
how tribal lands have been treated under the evolving doctrines of federal
Indian law. Cross forcefully illustrates the disconnect between the law’s
foundations, which sought to insulate Indian land from interference, and
the more modern conception of the federal plenary power, which largely
authorizes the federal taking of Indian land with little regard for tribal
interests or due compensation. He argues:
The contemporary survival of Indian societies requires
their protection from the ill-advised federal takings of
their lands. Indian treaties once recognized a vast
“Indian-only” zone in the American West: a geographic
area wherein the Indian peoples were free to choose a
legal, cultural, and economic system that best suited their
members’ needs. The federal government pledged to use
its regulatory and military capabilities to preserve this
Indian Country boundary. . . . The federal government’s
plenary power over Indian lands threatens to reduce the
Indian self-determination policy to rhetorical
extravagance. This power threatens those Indian lands
that will make possible the hoped-for revitalization of
Indian economies and cultures. 32
Drawing from that vein, Development’s Victim or its Beneficiary:
The Impact of Oil and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation seeks to answer the question of “whether the tribe’s
distinctive ties to their homelands, as embodied by their unique sovereign
and political rights within their reservation, can be adequately protected
from development’s overweening risks and impacts,” particularly in light
of the potential for immense economic benefits from such development. 33
True to his career as tribal legal counsel and advocate, Cross presents the
31.
32.
33.

Sovereign Bargains, supra note 16.
Id. at 505–06.
Victim or Beneficiary?, supra note 16, at 546.
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primary legal issues facing the Three Affiliated Tribes and maps a course
for the Tribes to follow to meet those “strategic challenges.” 34 In doing
so, Cross provides a practical guide for implementing theories of economic
development, including the prominent nation building model proposed by
Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt. 35 As such, though specific to the
challenges of development on the Fort Berthold Reservation, this work
continues to offer assistance to tribes across Indian Country who face the
same paradox between pursuing much-needed economic opportunities and
preserving the unique values of their land base.
Thus, though they span a decade, the arguments and proposals set
forth in these articles remain vibrant and relevant for those facing the
challenges of conflicts over tribal rights to natural resources and land.
III. PARADOX II: TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE
FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
Just as the seeds of conflicts over tribal rights to natural resources
were planted in the Supreme Court’s earliest Indian law decisions, those
cases also laid the foundation for a second paradox at the core of Raymond
Cross’ scholarship: the inherent tension between the exercise of tribal selfdetermination and the federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian
tribes.
This tension began with the Supreme Court’s efforts to define the
legal status of the Cherokee Nation and determine whether the Cherokee
constituted a “foreign state” for purposes of bringing an original action
before the Court. 36 Unable to agree that the Cherokee were “foreign,”
Chief Justice Marshall instead deemed the Nation a “domestic dependent
nation” whose relationship to the United States “resembles that of a ward
to its guardian.” 37 Though not unanimously supported by his fellow
justices at the time, 38 Marshall’s conceptions of tribal status and the
34.
Id. at 548–69.
35.
See, e.g., Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the
Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING
NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (Miriam
Jorgensen ed., 2007).
36.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831).
37.
Id. at 17.
38.
Id. at 22 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I cannot but think that there are
strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the epithet state, to a people so low
in the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are.”); Id. at 32
(Baldwin, J., dissenting) (“My view of the plaintiffs being a sovereign independent
nation or foreign state, within the meaning of the constitution, applies to all the tribes
with whom the Unites States have held treaties: for if one is a foreign nation or state,
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federal-tribal relationship remain bedrock principles of federal Indian law
to the present day. 39
In the very next term of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall
recognized further complexity in the status of tribes and their relation to
the federal government when confronted with the question of whether the
State of Georgia could apply its laws within Cherokee territory. Relying
on his views of tribes and their unique relationship with the federal
government, as documented in numerous treaties, Marshall confirmed the
sovereign status and territorial independence of the Cherokee from
Georgia’s interference:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States.40
Marshall’s recognition of inherent and distinct tribal sovereignty,
particularly in relation to state authority, and his conception of the federal
government’s “guardian” role to tribes, are the framework upon which
federal Indian law has been built.
Although federal Indian policy has often failed to serve the tribes’
best interests or protect tribal sovereignty, the modern era of tribal selfdetermination, ushered in by passage of the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA), 41 is based on a recognition
that the federal government has an obligation to “respond to the strong
expression of the Indian people for self-determination by assuring
maximum Indian participation in the direction of educational as well as
all others in like condition must be so in their aggregate capacity; and each of their
subjects or citizens, aliens, capable of suing in the circuit courts.”).
39.
See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Sanchez-Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872
(2016) (“After the formation of the United States, the tribes became domestic
dependent nations.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,
564 U.S. 162, 192 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Since 1831, this Court has
recognized the existence of a general trust relationship between the United States
and Indian tribes.” (citation omitted)).
40.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
41.
Pub. L. No. 93-638 (Jan. 4, 1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450450n (2012)).
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other Federal services to Indian communities so as to render such
services more responsive to the needs and desires of those
communities.” 42 To carry out this obligation, Congress, through the
ISDEAA and its subsequent amendments, authorized and encouraged
federal agencies to contract with Indian tribes and to transfer the
management, oversight, and control of federal Indian programs to tribes.
This structure is intended to “support[ ] and assist[ ] Indian tribes in the
development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of
administering quality programs and developing the economies of their
respective communities.” 43 While straightforward in purpose and laudable
in concept, the successful implementation of the self-determination policy
has been far more nuanced, particularly when that policy is viewed as
antithetical to the federal government’s trust responsibility. 44
Two of the articles republished here, Tribes as Rich Nations and
The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-Determination: An
Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, take on the paradox inherent in the selfdetermination era and the federal trust responsibility. Cross first takes
dead aim at the self-determination policy in Tribes as Rich Nations,
beginning with the powerful claim that “[e]mancipating today’s American
Indian peoples requires a fundamental restructuring of the contemporary
concept of tribal self-determination.” 45 By tracing the “life-cycle” of the
legal construct of an Indian tribe, from its birth in the opinions of Chief
Justice Marshall through its death during the allotment and assimilation
eras and its rebirth in the reorganization era of the 1930s, Cross sets the
stage for a new conception of tribes and tribal government that rejects the
“standard model of tribal self-determination.” 46 Rather than adhere to that
model’s recipe for tribes to take on the administration of “narrowly defined
statutory functions” and its attendant drawbacks, 47 Cross instead calls for
a new model of the tribe and tribal self-determination that transcends the
legal history of the tribal concept, reconnects tribal governments with
tribal cultures and constituencies, and “[re-]sets a place for [tribes] at the

42.
25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) (2012).
43.
Id. § 450a(b).
44.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003)
(rejecting a claim by the Navajo Nation that the federal government breached its
trust responsibility by approving a coal lease offering the Nation less than fair
market value in part because the Indian Mineral Leasing Act under which the claim
was brought “aims to enhance tribal self-determination” which is “directly at odds
with [federal] control over leasing” (citations omitted)).
45.
Tribes as Rich Nations, supra note 17, at 893.
46.
Id. at 897–923.
47.
Id. at 929–32.
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table of American governance.” 48 Again drawing on his experience with
and the history of the MHA Nation, Cross offers recommendations for
how tribes may do so, including the prescription that new constitutional
efforts will likely be necessary for the Three Affiliated Tribes to “reclaim
their tribal institutions.” 49
The challenge Cross laid down nearly two decades ago to redefine tribal self-determination remains a vigorous and daily pursuit for
tribes across Indian Country. Many tribes have pursued—and struggled
with—constitutional reform efforts, 50 including the Blackfeet Nation of
Montana, whose proposal to substantially revise its constitution was
submitted to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for review in the fall of 2016. 51
Cross’ notion that such work is necessary to “reclaim tribal institutions”
thus remains a prescient idea.
At a broader level, the evolution of the self-determination policy
has taken various forms since Tribes as Rich Nations was first published
in 2000. In the context of criminal jurisdiction, for example, Tribal Law
and Order Act of 2010 and the reauthorization of the Violence Against
Women Act in 2013 resulted in options for tribes to assume broader
sentencing powers and limited authority to try and punish certain nonIndian defendants. 52 These changes were in part motivated by the
recognition that the reach of self-determination policies was limited and,
much like Cross’ critique, supported only a narrowly defined expansion of
tribal authority. 53 And, perhaps consistent with the “standard model of
tribal self-determination,” these changes demand tradeoffs, including that
tribes adhere to U.S. Constitution standards (and, in one regard, standards
in excess of the constitution) 54 in order to exercise such broader powers
and authority. 55 Therefore, Cross’ critique and questions about the extent
48.
Id. at 924.
49.
Id. at 975.
50.
See, e.g., Tribal Executive Branches: A Path to Tribal
Constitutional Reform, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1662 (2016).
51.
Franz, supra note 5.
52.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7), 1304 (2012).
53.
See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the
Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 786 (2006) (“real self-determination has not
been-and cannot be-achieved until tribes can determine for themselves what is right
and what is wrong on their own reservations and in human transactions involving
their own members.”).
54.
See Jordan Gross, VAWA 2013’s Right to Appointed Counsel in
Tribal Court Proceedings – A Rising Tide that Lifts all Boats or a Procedural
Windfall for Non-Indian Defendants?, 67 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 379
(2016).
55.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c), 1304(d) (2012).
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to which tribes can truly exercise self-determination in the current era of
federal policy continue to offer relevant inquiry.
Similarly, An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine? lays out a direct
challenge to the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. Navajo
Nation, 56 offering instead a helpful construction of the federal
government’s trust obligations as requiring support for tribal selfdetermination efforts. 57 By tracing the intertwined roots of both the trust
responsibility and the inherent right of tribes to engage in selfdetermination, the “Romulus and Remus” of Indian law, 58 and the
subsequent inability of the Supreme Court to properly interpret and protect
the federal trust duty, Cross undercuts the basis of the majority’s opinion
in Navajo Nation, which relied, in part, upon the fallacy that tribal selfdetermination necessarily reduces, if not eliminates, any federal trust
obligation to tribes. 59 Instead, Cross rejects that zero-sum approach and
provides a method for ensuring that the federal government’s trust
obligations demand support for tribal self-determination. 60
Although the approach Cross suggests has not yet found
significant purchase in subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence,61
Congress has made clear that it views the federal trust obligation to tribes
in a similar manner. The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, passed in June
2016, reaffirmed “that the responsibility of the United States to Indian
tribes includes a duty to promote tribal self-determination regarding
governmental authority and economic development.” 62 This reaffirmation
of Congressional policy supports Cross’ proposed canon of judicial
interpretation that Indian statutes should be interpreted to preserve tribal
authority, especially the authority to engage in self-determination, unless
the statutory language expressly provides otherwise. 63 Whether the
judicial branch, and in particular the Supreme Court, recognizes this
56.
537 U.S. 488 (2005).
57.
Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, supra note 15, at 396 (proposing a
new judicial canon of construction that, without express language to the contrary,
“would require federal courts to presume that Indian self-determination statutes
preserve the historic rights Indians have traditionally enjoyed under the federal trust
relationship”).
58.
Id. at n. 24.
59.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
60.
Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, supra note 15, at 395–97.
61.
See, e.g., United States. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, n.
8 (2011) (describing various eras of federal Indian policy and concluding that “the
trust relationship has been altered and administered as an instrument of federal
policy” rather than to serve and support tribal self-determination).
62.
Pub. L. No. 114-178, 130 Stat. 433 (2016).
63.
Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, supra note 15, at 396.
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approach remains to be seen; however, Cross’ 2003 work provides a
convincing roadmap and justification for doing so.
Given the depth of experience, intellect, and ability reflected in
Cross’ work, it remains of timeless relevance. Readers of this volume will
undoubtedly identify issues and analysis posed by Cross’ work well
beyond the brief context and analysis offered here. And, particularly with
regard to the paradoxes of tribal treaty rights to land and natural resources,
tribal self-determination, and the federal trust responsibility, scholars,
attorneys, and, most importantly, tribal leaders, will continue to benefit
from this volume. Indeed, Cross’ dedication to serving tribes and their
leaders as legal counsel and advisor—the highest calling of a tribal
attorney—is reflected throughout these works and his incredible career.
IV. A LEGACY FOR INDIAN LEGAL EDUCATION
The idea for this issue was born from tributes to Raymond Cross
offered at the Public Land & Resources Law Review’s 2015 Public Lands
Conference. These tributes, offered by three of his former students, each
of whom has built a successful career in Indian law, spoke to Cross’
influence on a generation of lawyers who learned from him the
complexities and challenges of working for and on behalf of Indian tribes
and their people. His commitment to the continuing improvement and
enhancement of legal education is reflected in the final piece of this
volume, which calls for the legal academy to commit itself to “community
development and empowerment within America’s minority
communities.” 64 In doing so, Cross argues for a new model of legal
education that synthesizes community-based lawyering, as described by
Professor Anthony V. Alfieri, 65 with the “Native American lawyer
model,” which, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Morton v.
Mancari, 66 “helped spur the growth of the twin phenomena of Native
American diversity and Indian self-determination.” 67 According to Cross,
the Native American lawyer model has been quite successful in “re-

64.
Raymond Cross, The Fate of Native American Diversity in
America’s Law Schools, 27 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 47 (2013) [hereinafter Native
American Diversity].
65.
Anthony V. Alfieri, Educating Lawyers for Community, 2012 WIS.
L. REV. 115 (2012).
66.
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
67.
Native American Diversity, supra note 64, at 61.

MILLS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

2017

9/9/2017 10:49 AM

FOREWORD

13

shap[ing] the landscape, not just of Indian Country, but of American legal
education as well.” 68
The same could be said of Raymond Cross who, in his career as
an attorney, a teacher, and a scholar of Indian law, remains a model to
which each of us should aspire and whose scholarly work has helped shape
both the way we think about the law, as well as the law itself.69
It is a true honor to introduce and present some of his important
work.

68.
Id. at 55. This proposal, like those more specifically focused on
Indian law, continues to resonate, especially in light of recent challenges facing the
legal academy. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Law School Bust, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 2016, at BU1.
69.
See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 139 (1984); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986).

